It is a cause of great consternation to the pro-Muslim Democrats in the MSM and U.S. government that the marksmanship skills of our Taliban opponents have proved less than stellar of late. The New York Times‘ blogger C. J. Chivers’ latest posting, “At War: The Weakness of Taliban Marksmanship,” which goes into their shortcomings in great detail, along with expert analysis of steps these terrorists should take to become more effective in their attempts to kill our countrymen.
Without being beside Taliban fighters in a firefight or attending their training classes, it can be hard to say exactly what mistakes they are making when they repeatedly miss what would seem to be easy shots, such as Marines and Afghan soldiers upright in the open at 150 yards. Two things are clear enough. First, for combatants who become expert shots, the skills that make up accurate shooting have formed into habits. Second, many Afghan insurgents do not possess the full set of these skills. This is demonstrated by the results, but also by a behavior easy to detect in firefights: they often fire an automatic…
Even for the troop-movement-plan-leaking Times, this is disturbing. Chivers starts with the premise that the Taliban soldiers and their AK-47 rifles have every reason to be more successful – I mean, after all, these are the same Afghani riflemen that took down the mighty Soviet Army in Rambo III and, in reality, back in the 1980s. These Afghani terrorists are also descendants of the great Khyber rifleman who beat back the British with their hand-crafted long rifles. While these historic Afghans valued prowess with a rifle, it’s clear that the current Taliban forces have fallen prey to the same problem that plagues our American Ivy League college students:
They don’t believe they have to work for success.
They believe that simply because they are fighting the great Satan (ie., us) they will be victorious. But as those of us out here who actually know something about firearms and marksmanship have long since learned, marksmanship is a perishable skill. Any fool can point a gun, pull the trigger repeatedly (or once with full auto “Pray and Spray,” as my old instructor used to call it) and score an occasional hit, but consistently hitting a target requires frequent, concentrated practice.
Chivers goes then outlines the individual facets of rifle accuracy, including breathing, sight picture, and proper support for offhand shooting. His advice? The Taliban shouldn’t rely so much on fully automatic fire. They have to slow down, control their breathing and aim at the U.S. Soldiers more carefully.
With two cousins in the military, I must say this helpful analysis is entirely unwelcome. If the Taliban isn’t getting enough time on the practice range, I’m hoping it is because our troops and local Afghan regulars are making their life a living hell, keeping them too busy running and fighting to settle down for some serious practice.
Since we know that the Taliban reads the New York Times for helpful hints in fighting this war, I fully expect the gauntlet to be picked up by our representatives in Washington. Perhaps one of them will propose a bill to send aid money and firearms instructors to the Taliban in the name of “fairness” and “leveling the playing field.”
Also cited is the lack of proper vision correction (i.e. glasses) for the terrorists. Perhaps the Pentagon can issue new rules of engagement that require U.S. troops to hold fire until they are closer to the Taliban forces, along the lines of “don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes.”
Using the iron sights on an infantry rifle requires a mix of vision-related tasks. A shooter must be able to discern both the rifle’s rear and front sights (directly in front of the shooter’s face) and also see the target (as far as several hundred yards off). Then the former must be aligned with the latter. This is difficult in ideal circumstances for lightly trained gunmen; for some people with bad vision, it might be almost impossible. Over the years many officers and noncommissioned officers who train Afghan police and soldiers have said that a significant number of Afghan recruits struggle because of their eyesight. The Taliban recruit their fighters from the same population; poor vision can be expected to be a factor in their poor riflery.
This is a long, well-executed piece, and in case its impact is lost, Chivers promises to follow it up, in the interests of fairness and balance, with a future report on the “wild” rifle fire of American troops. I can’t wait.
Until then I, and the families of U.S. troops overseas, will be glad to see continued reports of shoddy rifle skills among our enemies. And wish the Times weren’t quite so blatantly rooting for the other side.