When President Trump unveiled his Afghanistan war-expansion plan in his August 21 speech, he used the phrase, “To prosecute this war, we will learn from history.” Taking the statement to heart, the president would do well to consult with his military advisers and consider all previous efforts over the centuries to subdue the Afghans — and their disastrous results.
For example, America might learn much from Great Britain’s repeatedly calamitous campaigns in the region.
Fearing Russian expansion into Central Asia, Britain’s “Great Game” in the 19th century consisted of protecting its Indian empire through repeated attempts at dominating the strategically placed buffer state of Afghanistan. Indeed, the British army invaded the country four times, in 1839, 1878, 1919, and 2001.
Perhaps the most horrific incursion was the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839.
The Emirate of Afghanistan had no standing army. When the Emir needed fighters, he simply called on the tribal chiefs. The British were therefore confident that the benighted, unorganized Afghan hillfolk were no match for the formidable Army of the Indus, which started out with 21,000 British and Indian troops, 38,000 civilians, 30,000 camels, and a herd of cattle.
How wrong they were.
Entering Kabul in 1839, the British invaders soon endured defeats and harsh winters; eventually, they found themselves outnumbered. The Afghans, masters of guerrilla warfare, were not impressed with British military effectiveness. An attempted escape to Jalalabad 90 miles away in January of 1842 resulted in the slaughter of 4,500 soldiers and 12,000 civilians by Afghan tribesmen. Women and children either perished or disappeared into captivity.
The Afghans allowed a single British soldier, Dr. William Brydon, to reach Jalalabad, no doubt to convey to British military planners the magnitude of the mighty army’s incredible, ignominious defeat. In British history books, it came to be called ”Elphinstone’s Massacre”– the worst British military disaster until the fall of Singapore in 1942.
Back home, politicians such as the Earl of Aberdeen and Benjamin Disraeli had criticized the war as rash adventurism, but it was too late. Still, since Britain had never suffered such an immense defeat, much of the British public continued to be captivated by the romantic image of the heroic British soldier under fire who gloriously triumphs in the end.
Britain spent over a century attempting to control Afghanistan, straining to influence Afghan foreign policy and squandering huge sums to equip Afghan military puppets and subsidize client Afghan governments.
Following World War II, however, an exhausted and impoverished Great Britain lost all influence over the country, as the Afghans sought to use the new Cold War to play America and the Soviet Union off against each other and as they leveraged hostilities between the newly founded nations of India and Pakistan to their own advantage.
Russia would have its turn in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Result: another cautionary tale for those who would subjugate Afghanistan.
For all of the Soviet Union’s much-touted military might, the Russians only managed to control some major cities and establish a presence, leaving about 80 percent of the country outside their influence. Indeed, the situation was so chaotic that regions like mountainous Hazarajat in central Afghanistan were not under Soviet, the Afghan government, or even rebel control, and were instead ruled by local tribal warlords.
During the Soviet Union’s attempt at occupation, the U.S. countered by training Islamic fighters called the mujahideen and providing covert support by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency — and its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI).
Ironically, an Afghan faction of the mujahideen called the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 and eventually provided refuge to al-Qaeda and the 9/11 mastermind, Osama bin Laden.
After the shock of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, America quickly arrived in Afghanistan and began its long presence there. But mission creep soon set in, expanding from simply destroying al-Qaeda training camps and capturing Bin Laden to wholesale regime change, nation-building, and defeat of the Taliban.
And so, whether it be Britain’s misbegotten military exploits, the ill-fated Soviet Union’s Afghan adventures, or America’s own seemingly endless involvement, Afghanistan – indeed the whole region — has long been a graveyard for foreign empires.
Indeed, the cost, in lives and treasure, of America’s longest (and undeclared) war is astounding. Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, conservatively estimates the total direct cost is $841 billion. This figure, however, does not take into account future committed costs or interest payments on the money borrowed to finance the war, which could easily bring the figure up to $2 trillion. Neta Crawford, a co-director of the Cost of Wars Project at Brown University, estimates that total combined war expenditures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan since 2001 are nearly $5 trillion.
Although the many cost estimates put forward may vary widely, they are all mind-boggling in size.
The human costs to America have been dearer. American deaths total 3,559, with thousands more wounded and maimed. The tragic rippling effect to families, loved ones, and American communities is incalculable.
The American public must come to realize the hard lesson that we cannot afford to permanently occupy the region. The vast sums expended on this hapless 16-year military stalemate could have paid for the rejuvenation of America’s infrastructure several times over.
Hanif Atmar, the Afghan national security adviser, believes that to defeat the Taliban we must take the conflict to their sanctuaries in Pakistan, our supposed ally that suffers from internal turmoil. This would be yet another nightmarish chimera for our already overextended military.
Better to face facts: This region is basically too complex for any nation, even a superpower, to control. A huge military and economic quagmire awaits, one that America must do its best to avoid. The enormous costs are out of proportion to any possible geopolitical advantage.
America’s 21st century version of Britain’s Great Game would inevitably be a Great Disaster.
One statement President Trump made in his speech gives me hope: “My original instinct was to pull out—and, historically, I like following my instincts.” Mr. President, please: follow your original instinct!
Ambassador Faith Whittlesey served twice (1981-83 and 1985-88) as U.S. ambassador to Switzerland and also served as a member of the White House senior staff (1983-85) during the Reagan administration.