Boots on the Ground Report: Obama Focused on the Wrong Election

In my last column titled “The Cost of Delay,” I highlighted that one of the primary second order effects of the Obama administration’s stalling on the Afghanistan decision was that the Afghan runoff election would necessarily be a repeat of the general election, complete with allegations of fraud and intimidation.

The issues surrounding the general election in Afghanistan were basically that it was poorly administered and security concerns were rampant as the Taliban tried to disrupt and influence the voting. Afghanistan with its 100,000 NATO forces does not have sufficient combat power to secure all of the provinces. It’s that simple. We had twice that amount to secure elections in Iraq, a country 1/3 smaller than Afghanistan, with 8,000,000 fewer citizens, and with far more infrastructure. For the Afghan runoff, there would have been no measurable difference in troop levels or international assistance from the first election, and so Abdullah Abdullah, the only viable contender to Karzai, pulled out believing the fix was in. Allegations of corruption and intimidation are just that, allegations, but should have been addressed. They weren’t.

Had Obama made a decision even 2-3 weeks after McChrystal’s report was delivered, the ready brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division could have been rolling out the door just as they had done in response to General Petraeus’ surge request for Iraq. Another brigade from one of the Army divisions such as the 101st Airborne, could have deployed shortly afterward. Such a move would have given General McChrystal and the UN election officials an additional 9,000 troops on the ground to address election concerns and deploy to sensitive areas where most of the voter issues were alleged to have occurred.

In other columns I’ve argued that there is not a full commitment from the U.S. Governmental departments to assist our troops as they focus on Afghan governance, security and economic progress. These two brigades could have been deployed with a commensurate level of effort from an inter-governmental team from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury to apply a ‘full court press’, if you will, toward the governance and economic lines of operation that are so critical in this fight. But there was none of that.

The Obama team should have had planners embedded in General McChrystal’s team this spring and summer so that parallel planning could have occurred, meaning when the McChrystal plan was delivered on 30 August to the President, the president and his team would have already worked their way through most of the issues and have their convictions in place, ready to make decisions. Even a phased response would have been adequate, such as, “Look, we know we’re going to send something, so let’s get two brigades in before winter while we debate some of the finer points of this counterinsurgency strategy.” Boom, the president pulls the trigger and he’s got paratroopers heading to Afghanistan to make a difference in the runoff and to get set before the winter locks in much of northern and central Afghanistan. He appears decisive and in command. Instead, the image he is portraying, unfortunately, is that he is playing politics with the lives of our troops, a dead letter if there ever was one.

Unfortunately, the only reasonable conclusion we can draw is that it appears the Obama administration had another election in mind, this week’s series of state elections. His calculation, it now seems, was to stay on the fence, not give away his base, while at the same time, tantalizing those that are strong on defense with feigned pensiveness. He was smart by half. Instead, of appearing firm and decisive, the American people revolted and rated him as timid. Instead of pulling voters along with him, he was trounced in states such as New Jersey and Virginia where the voters spoke mightily about Obama’s use of deployed troops as political tools. The Old Dominion voted nearly 60%-40% for Republican Bob McDonnell and a full Republican ticket for Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General. This from a state Obama carried by a wide margin just a year ago. How’s that working out for you, Mr. President? See what happens when you even whiff of abandoning our troops?

So, Obama’s strategy to stall until after the U.S. elections had precisely the opposite effect than his team was pursuing. The weekly roll out of his talking heads commenting on the ruminations of counterinsurgency versus counter-terrorism strategies, or wanting to know the details of provincial leaders, or how hard the national security team was working, have all been received as inexcusable delay, and rightly so. His team can toil all they want, but in an era that demands government accountability, let the record show that nine weeks after delivery, they have produced no response to McChrystal’s plan.

At a very minimum, had Obama acted with minimal prudence, he would have been able to secure the runoff and create the perception of a more valid government going forward in Afghanistan. Now, because of political calculations, mismanagement and incompetence, the Obama Administration has devalued Karzai and has made future progress in Afghanistan harder. The ‘harder’ part gets translated to the troops who have to execute the best they can in the face of Obama’s indecision.

While the Obama administration may be ambivalent to the sacrifices of our soldiers (and deeds speak much louder than photo ops here), it is undeniable that the American people love our troops. Play with their fate, Mr. President, and you play with your political future.

By focusing on the U.S. elections as a deadline not to be preceded with a decision on Afghanistan, the president guaranteed two election losses within less than a year of his taking office.

Abdullah Abdullah’s resignation from the Afghan election runoff is a result of Obama’s lack of sense of urgency toward Afghanistan. The U.S. electorate’s rallying cry for strong leadership this Tuesday is a referendum on Obama’s lack thereof.

I’m reminded of my 13 months in Afghanistan as the deputy commanding general for the joint task force when, in January of 2007 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates showed up at Bagram Air Base fresh off a brutal round of planning and approving of the surge in Iraq. In a small gathering of leaders he asked, “What do you need to stem the Taliban surge this spring?”

We showed him a detailed, well reasoned plan that mandated another full brigade combat team. We would have liked more, but the facts were that Iraq was the main effort and the Army and Marine Corps had little left to give.

Within a week we had a decision that our request was approved and the troops were flowing.

That’s leadership.