Boots on the Ground Report: The Cost of Delay

While the Obama violinists’ supple wrists magically fiddle with their bows, the firefights continue in Afghanistan. General Stan McChrystal’s thorough assessment requesting 60,000-40,000 additional troops is now over seven weeks old and the Obama administration’s duplicity is becoming more evident by the day.

This amazing lack of dexterity is rather stunning given then candidate-Obama’s pledge that this was a war of necessity that we must win. Was that really just a headline grabber to convince moderate democrats that he would be strong on defense? It is increasingly appearing that way.

So let me be clear about the cost of delay:

First, while Obama has deliberated, troops he has previously described as “under resourced” are fighting and dying…and still under resourced.

Second, the Taliban are terrorizing civilians in those areas that lack significant or any coalition force presence and very courageous political leaders at the local governance level are left defenseless.

Third, we may miss the window of opportunity presented by the traditional Taliban operational pause in December and January.

Fourth, we exponentially complicate the deployment and reception of the 40,000 troops as ships have to be ordered, planes scheduled, operating bases built, and supplies delivered.

Fifth, had Obama acted promptly, he may have had additional troops to help with the election runoff agreed upon this week.

Sixth, with each day that Stan McChrystal’s request goes unanswered, the president gives the green light for his legions of political hacks and pudgy pundits, none of whom can hold McChrystal’s jock strap, to malign the general and minimize both his stature and his assessment. No biggie to McChrystal personally, but the enemy makes hay with this kind of thing in the terrorist recruiting world.

Make no mistake about it, General McChrystal states clearly in his assessment the criticality of time. He highlights that we must win this in the next 12 months. Obama has already burned through nearly two months of that time making sure he shows McChrystal who’s the boss. His indecision is costing time, lives and trust.

-Under resourced mission. According to the Washington Post’s “Faces of the Fallen”, 40 U.S. military personnel have been killed in Afghanistan since August 30 2009, the date stamped on McChrsytal’s plan. That’s nearly half of a rifle company wiped out. Multiply that by ten and you have the approximate count of wounded. What difference might rapid deployment troops have made for those 40 great Americans had Obama acted decisively and promptly? Sadly, we’ll never know…nor will their families.

-Securing the population and its leaders. This notion that the Obama administration is spreading about there being no partner for success achieved on the ground is patently false. I’ve seen first hand brave governors and provincial leaders who have conducted missions with the Afghan and coalition forces because they so strongly believe in the future of their country. The Obama administration’s shameless maligning of Karzai is duplicitous as it is a means to an end: to provide top cover for this inexcusable stall. What’s unconscionable is that while the Obama administration has been busy battering Karzai, the Taliban continues to wrought destruction on Afghan leaders, villages and families.

-The window of opportunity. The third cost of delay is that we miss this window of opportunity to disrupt the enemy while he is attempting to generate his own combat power and replenish his means of war. Thus, it will be another fighting season until that window opens again.

The Taliban operate in cycles in Afghanistan. They traditionally slow down some operations in December and January to refit and plan. Some of it is weather related and much of it is cyclical. The enemy uses a small force to hold what gains they have made while they conduct refit operations in Pakistan and in their lairs inside Afghanistan during the winter months. These operational pauses are windows of opportunity and the Obama administration’s delay has all but ensured that we will recognize this window by the sound of its slamming shut.

Contrarily, to insert large numbers of forces into these areas proximate to the Taliban hideouts and routes during the operational lull would pressure the enemy to do one of two things. Either they would have to forego their refit operations where they do things like rest, recover, resupply ammunition and the myriad other logistical and human functions an army requires, or they would have to collapse some of their holding action and cede terrain to the larger U.S. force.

It appears that we will instead be deploying these additional troops, if approved, into the teeth of the traditional Taliban build up in the spring that follows two cycles. First, in February through April, the enemy conducts massive logistical resupply, stakes its claims again on the poppy regions, and gets into defensive posture while also sizing up new ambush locations for roadside bombs. They also increase their intelligence collection on coalition forces, all of which is easier to do with less pressure on your forces. Second, the enemy rank and file then harvest the poppy, fighting only when necessary to defend their crops. Once the poppy resin is sold in May, the Taliban are flush with cash and June through October is their serious fighting time.

-Complicating the logistics. As Obama’s decision point slides to the right on the calendar, McChrystal’s 12-month mark, August 30th, remains fixed. The President had 18 months of campaigning and 10 months of his presidency to develop a plan. Meanwhile, the simple logistics of raising and sustaining an army become more complex with every day of delay inside the 12-month timeline. It took six months to deploy the six surge brigades into Iraq, a similar size force the U. S. commander in Afghanistan has requested. One from the 82nd Airborne Division was out of the gate in days, closing all of its forces within four weeks. If we do the math, Obama has burned two months of the 12-month window and now the best we can do is close the last of the 40,000 by month eight, giving General McChrystal four months to turn the tide in Afghanistan. That is hardly enough time for the young privates, sergeants, lieutenants and captains to build trust and relationships in their new areas of responsibility. Meanwhile we need to build new forward operating bases, deliver tons of supplies, and prepare the Afghan government and people for the increase in forces. No small order.

-The election runoff. President Obama made a big deal out of picking up the phone and calling Afghan President Hamid Karzai, congratulating him on agreeing to the runoff election. I’m hopeful that Karzai, known for speaking his mind, mentioned to Obama that those extra troops General McChrystal ordered a couple of months ago might have come in handy as a runoff is planned and executed. Visualize the most challenging terrain, with remote populations, on dirt roads, hundreds of miles from major road networks, with hundreds of enemy who want to disrupt the process. I’m not talking about Florida or Minnesota, naturally, but about Afghanistan and its inhabitants. We used triple the amount of combat power to secure the Iraqi elections in far less austere conditions. Obama’s delay promises that the runoff election will most likely be a repeat of the first. Here, again, he could have made a huge difference if he had acted promptly.

There are other second order effects from this delay, most unrecognizable at this moment. For example, who knows what kind of success we could have in Pakistan with our drone attacks if we put more pressure on the border with additional troops? With that success in the sanctuary, might we be able to disrupt another London bombing plot, Madrid attack, or even a 9-11?

While assuredly increased casualties, stranded political leaders, missed windows of opportunity, and complicated logistics are egregious enough, what we might miss in Pakistan is what should really bother us.

Napoleon is rumored to have said to one of his generals, “I can give you anything but time.”

Unfortunately, it appears that General McChrystal will not even have that.