This is the latest in a series of exclusive interviews with Dr. Paul Kengor, professor at Grove City College, on his latest work, Dupes: How America’s Adversaries Have Manipulated Progressives for a Century, which is based on a remarkable volume of declassified materials from Soviet and Communist Party USA archives and FBI files. Dinesh D’Souza calls Dupes “a significant addition to our historical understanding of the past hundred years.” Big Peace’s Peter Schweizer calls it the “21st century equivalent” to Whittaker Chambers’ classic Witness.
Big Peace: Professor Kengor, based on Dupes and other books, especially two books on Ronald Reagan (click here and here), plus the fact you teach Middle East politics, you have some very interesting material for us on Moammar Gaddafi and Libya, especially concerning the Carter and Reagan years.
Kengor: We might begin with Gaddafi’s role in the “Anti-Sadat Steadfastness and Confrontation Front,” where (in 1978) he allied with the worst dictators in calling for the head of Anwar Sadat for Sadat’s crime of talking to Israel. Also during this period, Egypt had turned away from the USSR, symbolized by Sadat expelling thousands of Soviet military advisers. The Soviets looked for other clients in the region. They focused on the two Baathist regimes, Assad’s Syria and Saddam’s Iraq, and also Gaddafi’s Libya. All three flirted with a weird admixture of Arab nationalism and socialism. Libya would get, among other things, Soviet MiGs.
Big Peace: When the Carter years arrived, some odd things happened between the United States and Libya.
Kengor: I’ll focus on two. The first involved President Carter’s brother, Billy. Billy Carter was a rube, a colorful, beer-swilling, good ‘ol boy, renowned for branding his own “Billy Beer.” That was innocent enough. But Billy ended up an “agent” to the Libyans, with whom he was close. He played a distinct foreign-policy role as a liaison between the White House and Libya over our hostages in Iran, and did so–brace yourselves–with the support of not only the president but the first lady and even national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Big Peace: This hasn’t been mentioned in recent reporting on Libya. When did we first learn about this?
Kengor: The story broke in late July 1980. I’ll quote an AP piece at the time: “President Carter’s national security advisor [Brzezinski] capitalized on Billy Carter’s controversial relations with the Libyan government by using him as a go-between in seeking Libya’s assistance in an effort to gain release of the American hostages in Iran, White House officials say.” This was rightly reported as a “revelation.” That same story noted that Billy Carter had “reluctantly registered with the Justice Department last week as an agent of the Libyan government.”
Big Peace: And the White House confirmed this?
Kengor: Absolutely–and added details. The president press secretary, Jody Powell, said Brzezinski asked Billy to set up a meeting with Ali el-Houderi, Libya’s chief representative in Washington. That meeting took place November 27, 1979.
Adding a sense of scandal, the press reported that Billy received $220,000 from the Libyans, which, as the AP noted, “Billy Carter and the Libyans have characterized as part of a $500,000 loan.”
Big Peace: Wow. Did any of this help with the hostages in Iran?
Kengor: The press reported that Brzezinski was informed that Gaddafi “had sent a message” to the Ayatollah calling for the hostages’ release. Perhaps. Obviously, though, they weren’t released.
Big Peace: President Carter knew about this?
Kengor: That crucial question was raised during an August 4, 1980 White House press conference, where President Carter acknowledged that he “decided to use Billy to see if he [Billy] could have some special influence to get the Libyans to help.” It’s striking today to read the formal transcript of this bizarre press conference, which is in Carter’s Presidential Papers. Three-quarters of the questions concerned Billy’s involvement with the Libyan government and some “oil plan.” You need to see it to believe it. Here’s an excerpted transcript:
Q: Mr. President, you said in the report that you issued tonight — you confirmed the fact that your wife, Rosalynn Carter, was the first person to initiate the idea of using your brother Billy as the contact regarding the Iranian hostages ——
The President: Yes, that’s correct.
Q: ———- that she called him directly and then informed you later, and you asked Dr. Brzezinski to pursue the matter. I want to ask you what you think that says about her role in this administration and what the public should conclude about it? And secondly … whether you have any second thoughts in hindsight about family diplomacy and the virtues of that?
The President: No, I don’t have any trepidation about continuing the policy that I have pursued in that respect. I think it’s completely appropriate for Rosalynn to have thought about how we could get the hostages released and to have called Billy to see if he thought he could possibly help. When he said that he might be able to help, she informed me of that idea. I considered it. I’m the one that made the decision, not my wife or Dr. Brzezinski or anyone else. And I decided that it was a good idea….
So this kind of thing that a president’s family legitimately ought to be able to do.
President Carter harbored no trepidation about deploying Billy, or involving the first lady. He said it was “completely appropriate.” One wonders what the Iranians thought. I bet the Ayatollah raised an eyebrow.
Big Peace: And the plot thickens. You say that even the Romanians got ideas?
Kengor: Possibly. Romania was run by the most brutal Communist Bloc dictator, Nicolai Ceausescu. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, chief of Romanian intelligence, Ceausescu paid close attention to Billy Carter’s peculiar diplomatic service. Pacepa recalls conversations with Ceausescu about recruiting Billy Carter as a Romanian agent. He considered how to make that happen through Libyan officials. The Romanian tyrant saw Billy as primed for manipulation. And considering Ceausescu’s view of the gullibility of Jimmy Carter, he must have seen Billy, the backwoods brother, as an ideal dupe.
Big Peace: This is all quite remarkable. Let’s address the other significant thing with Libya during the Carter years, which you believe holds key lessons. Tell us about the Gulf of Sidra.
Kengor: I write about this in a piece for USA Today, which is co-authored with Bill Clark, the single most important player in Reagan’s take-down strategy against the Soviets. I’m Clark’s biographer. The biography, The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan’s Top Hand. Please buy the book, and learn about a national hero who’s still doing good work. Clark was acting secretary of state when the Gulf of Sidra crisis hit.
The Gulf of Sidra is off the North African coast in the Mediterranean, one of the world’s most travelled waterways. Each year, our Sixth Fleet conducted naval exercises in these waters, without dispute.
All of that suddenly changed when Gaddafi unilaterally extended Libya’s presence some 200 miles deep into the gulf, far beyond its 12-mile coastal limit–and putting it off limits to America. This was flatly illegal.
Big Peace: You say the Carter administration didn’t challenge this?
Kengor: The Carter administration rescheduled and relocated U.S. exercises. Apparently, the administration feared provoking Gaddafi, and also, I imagine, feared jeopardizing Libyan assistance with our hostages in Iran. Whatever the reason, it was a significant show of weakness, especially given everything else going on. We were losing key allies to communism. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and were picking up satellites everywhere. We lost the Shah. We were losing the Cold War and getting beat up in the Middle East.
Big Peace: This is where the Reagan administration comes in. You say that Reagan refused to be bullied by Gaddafi and his clowns.
Kengor: Reagan refused to reschedule and relocate U.S. military exercises. He pledged to resume them, then and there, in the Gulf of Sidra. He knew this could lead to a military exchange. When the commanding officer asked Reagan if U.S. aircraft had the right to retaliate against Libyan aircraft, Reagan emphatically said “yes.” When asked how far our aircraft could pursue Libyan planes, Reagan replied: “All the way into the hangar.”
It was a new day in Washington.
Big Peace: In the USA Today piece, you and Clark write that it never got as far as the hangar.
Kengor: Correct. In August 1981, one year after that Carter press conference, ironically, two Libyan planes fired missiles at two F-14 Tomcats escorting our ships. They missed. Our planes fired back, and the two Libyan planes found themselves in the Mediterranean.
That’s how you deal with Gaddafi.
Big Peace: You mean with military power?
Kengor: Yes and no. Military power certainly worked then and also in April 1986, when we acted against Libya unilaterally, without seeking approval from the “international community.” The French literally stood in our way.
I believe the lesson is not necessarily that a commander-in-chief must fire the guns, but he must not waffle and must maintain a clear sense of purpose. We’re not seeing that in Obama, nor did we in Carter. We saw it in Reagan.
Look, this is a complicated situation in Libya right now. I agree. But the commander-in-chief can’t be confused, or appear confused. He can’t send mixed signals. Here again, history speaks to us. Know your history. Read books, and not just the latest TV ticker interrupted every five minutes by another Viagra commercial.