Fellow contributer here, Jim Hanson, beat me to the punch on Russia’s military buildup. While true they are making efforts to modernize their military, mostly comprised of old Soviet era equipment, they still have a lot of making up to do. Even under the most optimistic of circumstances, Russian military clout would still leave a lot to be desired, at least compared to the US. What is clear, at least for the foreseeable future, is a resurgent Russia set to challenge US hegemony just isn’t in its future.
The Russian Federation’s ascension from the Cold War has operated paradoxically. It is not a nation state (in the European sense) but has strong currents of nationalism running through the mainstream of life, entertainment, politics, and education. It projects itself as modern, democratic, and Western but distinctly Russian therefore often putting it at odds with the Western nations. Yet it has steadily veered towards reimperialization, struggles with implementing a market economy, shown no use for political pluralism, and autocratic control from the Kremlin increases each year, with each passing election. Relations between the US and Russia have reached different points of and hot and cold over the years since the Cold War ended. They seemed to have worsened in the last months of George W Bush’s presidency.
Some have tried to make it easy to speculate that an extension of the Cold War resumed when the US placed American missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland. Likewise, they made easy to entertain the Cold War entered a re-icing stage when Russia invaded Georgia. The Russian-Georgia war could be viewed as a turn for the worse in the US-Russian confrontation. And the Russian victory plus the will to use military force in its region, tipped the balance to Russia. This is fanciful thinking. Russia does not possess the superpower qualities needed in order to align the world back in a bipolar arrangement, as was the case during the Cold War. Nor is it able to operate and deploy globally to such an extent as to significantly undermine America’s long-term interests or force it to reallocate resources away from fighting terrorism in the Middle East. Instead, Russia exists on the periphery of Europe with a few basic goals: Sovereignty, reclaiming some of its geopolitical clout, oil production, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. As is always dominant in international relations, Russia has sought domestic strength and stability through its oil supply and used its leverage in natural resources as a political weapon. Between 1998 and 2006, the price of oil rose from $15 to $70 per barrel creating huge cash surpluses. When the price of oil plummeted, the vulnerabilities of Russia’s economy were apparent.
While it is true that Russia is the main oil and natural gas supplier in Europe, with some future estimates predicting it could possibly export 70 percent to the region, it appears these estimates could be flawed. Partly the reason why Russia is exporting so much oil in recent years is because it started at the bottom after the Soviet collapsed. In other words, Russia climbed so high because of how far it had fallen. Since then, however, it has discovered no new oil, relies on old wells, and allows little foreign investment for industry growth. As a result, oil exports have declined since 2008. Russia’s oil exports seem to have peaked at least for the time being. Even more troubling perhaps is Russia’s demographic crisis. Russia’s population has lost 7 million people since 1992; death rates outnumber birth rates by a quarter million. “In the last 40 years the death rate for men between 15 and 64 years of age has jumped by an average of 50 percent” (J. McHugh, 2008).
Conclusion
These are not the qualities of a robust nation destined to challenge US hegemony. Instead, Russia resents the US policy of full spectrum dominance and nuclear supremacy, because of which Russia finds itself unable to compete. All the old Cold War relics simply add theater to a very basic international relations scenario. A stronger power is preventing a weaker one from doing what it wants. Nonetheless, there is real apprehension on the part of Russia from perceived encirclement by NATO, a growing number of American military bases throughout the world, and American missiles. The simple truth is that the Cold War did indeed end with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and Russia is not likely to fill the role as new Cold War nemesis. Neither though does it have to be a partner with the US or the West. “Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western Solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system” (D. Trenin, 2007).
In the eyes of Russia, the missile shield project is about America establishing nuclear primacy. With American missiles in the region, American military armaments going to Georgia, and high tech experimental missile defense satellites into space, Russia has lost the capability to counter a nuclear first strike. Russia finds its considerable nuclear arsenal vulnerable if not obsolete. By greatly reducing Russia’s threat of nuclear strike, the US has essentially eliminated “mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD of course was viewed as the ultimate equilibrium in the nuclear standoff during the Cold War. American nuclear primacy, however, swung the equilibrium decidedly in the favor of America leaving Russia out in the cold. It is no mystery as to why Russia feels exposed to possible hostility from the U.S. and NATO over its expansion.
In view of this, Russia can become more aggressive, obstruct international cooperation, and exert its influence in places that are possible. It can even increase its military posture and become more Moscow-centric. For example, Russia announced this year it will continue its military modernization and buildup that started in 2008. Reportedly, Russia is willing to spend an estimated $600 to 700 billion over ten years to move away from its Soviet era weaponry. This equates to roughly 5 percent of Russia’s estimated gross domestic product. In comparison, the US on the other hand makes up roughly 47 percent of the world’s total military spending! At such a reduced state and under an insurmountable disadvantage, militarily and economically speaking, today’s Russia and the world it finds itself in pales in comparison to yesterday’s Soviet Union and the bygone Cold War era. Therefore, at no time in the foreseeable future can Russia rise to the status of the former Soviet Union, realign the world back into a bipolar arrangement, and hope to challenge the US across the globe.