The US Senate gave its assent to ratification of the new START treaty but added significant new policy requirements that may require the US to actually improve its nuclear arsenal and modernize its nuclear enterprise even as we reduce our overall level of deployed nuclear weapons by one-third. Not unlike the build-down theories discussed during the Reagan administration, the idea is to “modernize as you reduce.” The issue before the Senate was not that the new START treaty did not allow us to modernize; the issue was whether we would.
This is not a trivial matter. During the past few years, many critics of US nuclear policy have complained we are spending too much on nuclear matters. One study concluded the US was spending over $55 billion annually on “nuclear weapons.” In a 20,000 word assessment I did of this report, I found the analysis for some strange reason included $10 billion on missile defense as part of this overall number, which was a “stretch” to put in mildly. Other spending estimates were equally questionable.
But the study was widely reportedly by the drive-by media. And the message was simple: the US was apparently wedded to Cold War levels of nuclear weapons spending. The implication: tens of billions of annual expenditures could safely be eliminated.
When the current administration countered Senate concerns over its commitment to nuclear modernization with proposals to spend some $18.5 billion annually on the nuclear enterprise, many reports concluded there could now of course be no doubt that the US would maintain a modern, sustainable and effective nuclear enterprise, even as we reduced deployed strategic nuclear weapons to roughly 1500.
But how to square a new promise of $18.5 billion in future yearly expenditures with the reported excessive past spending of $55 billion a year? What was going on? Well, the $55 billion was an exaggerated number, designed to score political points and raise the specter of a military industrial complex wedded to excessive nuclear weapons spending. And the $18.5 billion figure was designed to impress critics of the START treaty, as if these newly promised future budgets were something new and exciting.
The story is not so glamorous. The administration–whose campaign rhetoric sounded decidedly anti-nuclear– was actually making investments in the nuclear warhead enterprise that provided much needed modernization. Some of this had not been forthcoming in the previous administration. This was due in large part to three factors: one, a hostile attitude toward almost all such spending proposed by the previous administration by the left in the country; two, a serious disinterest on the part of the country since the end of the Cold War, including some important senior Bush administration officials in nuclear matters in general; and three, the absence of a compelling narrative that laid out why such investments were needed some 20 years after the Cold War ended and as we continued to reduce both deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons.
Much of the current push for strong nuclear modernization comes from the conclusions of the Perry-Schlesinger Commission on Strategic Forces. Its report probably stunned those on the left who thought it would recommend sharply cutting nuclear investments. One of its key members, Dr. Keith Payne, saved our nuclear deterrent by his successful efforts to get the Commission to strongly endorse nuclear modernization, including cutting off efforts within the Commission to undercut missile defense.
The START treaty debate was in many respects a replay of these recent struggles. Little known and reported on was the adoption of a number of amendments to the resolution of ratification which give further impetus to nuclear modernization and followed the recommendations of the Commission. For example, amendment 4904 requires the President to certify prior to entry into force of the treaty that it is the policy of the United States to qualitatively and quantitatively improve US missile defenses. This includes deployment of all four phases of the proposed European-based, NATO endorsed, Phased Adaptive Approach, with the last phase having a capability against ICBMs that could hold at risk the US homeland. In addition, and very importantly, the amendment requires the continued development of the two-stage ground-based interceptors as a technological and strategic hedge to the PAA.
The amendment further expressed the position of the United States that “the deployment of these systems does not constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the treaty, and therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying Russian withdrawal from the Treaty.” According to a report in The Weekly Standard, “this much more directly confronts the Russian position on the matter, when compared to the unilateral statement issued by the United States at the signing of the treaty. The amendment requires the President to communicate all of this to Russia at the time of the exchange of the instruments of ratification. The amendment also provided an Understanding that the treaty preamble does not impose a legal obligation on the parties, which will be included in the instrument of ratification.”
Just as important, amendment 4864 was adopted “which requires the President to certify prior to entry into force of the treaty that he intends to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, namely a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM.” Future roadmaps for each of these systems currently are being considered and debated within the Department of Defense and administration. Their adoption in full consultation with Congress would do much to reassure critics of new START.
Again according to the Weekly Standard, two additional amendments were adopted critical to the nuclear enterprise: “Amendment 4892 was adopted by consent to the Resolution of Ratification, which requires the President to certify prior to entry into force of the treaty that he intends to accelerate to the extent possible the design and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF); and request full funding, including on a multi-year basis as appropriate, for these facilities upon completion of the design and engineering phase for such facilities.”
Furthermore, “When those two amendments are combined with the President’s commitment to provide annual updates to the 1251 report concerning the budget plan to modernize the US nuclear complex, the Congress will have a substantial basis to provide the resources necessary for the President’s own plan to modernize the entire US nuclear complex.” And as we know, such modernization is a prerequisite to any nuclear reductions.
It remains an open question whether or not the US actually does modernize its nuclear enterprise. Last week, a New York Times op-editorial by the director of Global Zero called all this funding unnecessary. So while the rhetorical and policy commitment is there, in writing and now in ratification language, there is much to do to ensure America’s nuclear deterrent remains viable, effective and modern. Part of that effort, ironically, will be to focus “like a laser beam” on the serious proliferation threats of Iran and North Korea, and their terrorist allies that seek nuclear weapons with which to attack the United States and its allies. The new START treaty is thus not the end of a process but just the beginning.
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