Limit Defenses? Let's Not Rush to START

The Washington Post reports that the administration has once again strongly asserted that the new START treaty, under consideration by the US Senate, does not limit “our” missile defense plans as they are currently being proposed by the United States.

Say “Cheese!”

This is indeed one of the central issues of the START treaty–the attempt to re-link strategic missile defense with arms control and our nuclear deterrent. As the Post sees it, what is at issue is whether the US is really committed to the last phase of the adaptive NATO-based missile defense. This is the defense scheduled for deployment around 2020 that would defend both Europe and the US from a long- range missile from Iran, for example.

However, this is only part of the story. The real issue is whether our current missile defenses based here on the continental United States in California and Alaska will be modernized, improved or enlarged. This could be through the deployment of a third site in say New York at one military base such as Ft. Drummond. We could deploy Navy Aegis missiles ashore or at sea to defend against a maritime launched EMP or other rocket launch. We could develop and deploy systems based on directed energy lasers or space or other sea-based systems.

None of this has been addressed by the treaty supporters except briefly in what is apparently a little noticed article this fall in the quarterly journal Foreign Affairs. Bruce Blair, the head of Global Zero, an organization pushing for zero nuclear weapons, wrote that the US under the Russian understanding of the START treaty is limited to no more than 100 “strategic” interceptors.

This is precisely the number of the now defunct and rejected ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, I believe that number is not a coincidence. There is a cadre of professional analysts who hate missile defense, and see it as a threat to strategic stability. They would like to see our missile defenses seriously proscribed. The language of the new START treaty, they hope, will allow them to push for just such restrictions.

For thirty years, they have ridiculed missile defense as nothing more than a “Star Wars” fantasy. So what would be the implications of a ceiling of 100 “strategic” interceptors, as Blair proposes?

We have 30 missile interceptors deployed in silos now in Alaska and California. Deploying an additional 70 such interceptors, on Navy Aegis ships for example, would allow some 20-25 to be deployed at any one time if two other capable ships were also required to deploy such interceptors to allow one on station all the time, wherever that may be.

That is hardly an adequate defense! On the other hand, if we deployed the Navy missiles ashore, we could have 70 deployed interceptors at any one time, which would be a better number.

However, why should our defenses be limited at all? After all, threats from Iran, North Korea, China and other places are not limited by the new START treaty. And many of these threats are expanding. Iran can now stage its rockets flight and use solid fuel propellant, both serious developments.

And certainly, Russia and China have not exactly been pursuing non or counter proliferation in missiles or nuclear technology re: Iran and North Korea as required by the MCTR or NPT. So we cannot rely on either Moscow or Peking to limit such threats.

This is why many Senators have expressed concern over the treaty. That is why it does little to claim that the treaty does not limit “our” current plans for missile defense–the issue is also the next administration or a new Congressional initiative, not just our planned deployments.

After all, the administration’s “plan” cut 24 interceptors scheduled for deployment in Alaska. It killed the airborne laser and the kinetic energy initiative among other technologies. And it eliminated the missile defense deployments planned for Poland and the Czech Republic, systems designed precisely to deal with long-range missile threats from Iran.

In addition, while the US now has a limited NMD (national missile defense) capability, eventually a space-based deployment is required for us to really do the job. An Aegis compliment to the current NMD system is also certainly needed. And we should push for deployment of such a defense before 2020, which is the current plan. Does Russia object to these suggested missile defenses? They certainly have stated their strong opposition to any deployments beyond those already in the field. Should not this matter be clarified?

This is especially needed in light of Mr. Blair’s piece. It was written with two-retired Russian Strategic Rocket Forces general officers. There was a message in the article. At least 37 Senators apparently heard this message, if the recent vote on missile defense in the Senate is any indication of how Senators think on this matter.

But this debate has just started. Finishing START too soon will stop that debate. We need to clearly decide what our national security strategy is on missile defense before we decide whether to ratify START.

Is it going to be “Back to the era of the ABM treaty”, disguised in seemingly innocent language in the preamble to START? Or alternatively, will it be toward an era of a layered, global missile defense? A defense as critical a part of our deterrent and national defense–as President’s Reagan envisioned– as the nuclear Triad now standing watch at our Minuteman, Trident submarine and B52 and B2 bomber bases, operated by crews of the finest caliber in the US Air Force and US Navy.