Who at the Pentagon is Whispering in Bob Gates' Ear?

On October 21, we told you that a DoD official had leaked the findings of a confidential investigation into Michael Furlong and his highly successful Force Protection program to the New York Times. The leak was authorized in an effort to embarrass Furlong and “make him go away.” The New York Times subsequently held off on the story, but a week later someone else ran with it.

On October 29, Kimberly Dozier of the Associated Press published a piece entitled Pentagon Says Intel Contractors Went Too Far. Here’s what’s troubling.

According to my sources, what was leaked to the New York Times was only the investigation’s “findings and recommendations” – essentially an executive summary. Because the Times initially held off on running the story, the high-level leaker was forced to seek another media outlet to tout his “investigation.” Enter the Associated Press.

Or should I say enter Kimberly Dozier – as in enter right into the Pentagon.

Instead of being given the “executive summary” of the Star Chamber investigation against Michael Furlong, sources confirm that Dozier was invited into a room inside the Pentagon and left alone with the 15 page report marked, “Secret,” so that she would have all the information she needed to write her story. (Page 2 of the report contained the recommendations advocated by its author and initialed by Secretary Gates.)

This pursuit of Furlong is reprehensible. The man has never once been given a chance to defend himself. During the entire “investigation” he wasn’t even interviewed. Not a single investigator spoke to him. What’s more, some of the highest level military personnel who were recipients of the involved information gathering in Afghanistan and Pakistan – people with firsthand knowledge of Furlong’s highly successful program protecting American soldiers and Marines – weren’t even interviewed or they obfuscated their knowledge.

The allegations against Furlong are that Furlong misled his superiors about the purpose of his information collection operation. This is a total canard put forth by the investigator; a person who knows full well that the military authorities in Kabul – as well as four hundred (400) other recipients in both military and civilian intelligence agencies worldwide – received this data and were overwhelmed with the quality of the information.

Furlong’s Force Protection specialists developed extensive human networks throughout Afghanistan and deep into Pakistan. From these networks, they gathered important information about suicide bombers, roadside bomb-makers, planned attacks against military bases and convoys, etc. All of that information was then given to the U.S. military. What the military did with the information at that point is largely unknown to the people who gathered it, save for what has been published in the media. This is because the recipients never once told the gatherers what was done with the information. There was no official feedback or discussion on how the military might cooperate with the information gatherers to prevent debacles like the May 2010 attacks in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield.

Instead, the military took the information generated by Furlong’s specialists and used it to go after the bad guys. Good idea, right? I think so, but here’s where things really get bogged down. Drone strikes started happening across the border in Pakistan and Pakistan’s corrupt intelligence apparatus, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) got very angry. The ISI got on the phone to their CIA counterparts and raised hell because drone strikes were being made against targets that the ISI had not given the CIA. (It is common knowledge in military and intelligence circles that the CIA is primarily dependent upon the ISI for targeting.)

As we reported last spring, a proxy war between CIA and DoD then began to play out on the front pages of the New York Times. What we are watching in the press now is an attempt to patch things up. That’s good. What’s bad, though, is that the DoD is extending the CIA a peace offering – Michael Furlong’s head on a pike.

I wanted to understand exactly what Mr. Furlong and his Force Protection program were doing and why it has been so critical to protecting our brave men and women in the AF/Pak theater, so I requested his input for this article. The following is what I received:

“My experience on the ground in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and especially Afghanistan, combined with Major General Michael T. Flynn‘s expose on the shortcomings of the USG Intelligence Community (CNAS Report in Jan 2010), all cause me to believe that we have a full-spectrum information gap, and concomitant Situational Understanding (SU) gap, at the tactical and operational levels of the Afghan War. This adversely affects Force Protection and SU of the operational environment–cornerstones of effective/successful operations on the ground in Afghanistan.

In Information Operations (IO) Doctrine we talk about P-M-E-S-I-I analysis and Target Audience Analysis (TAA) for Psychological Operations. PMESII equals: Political domain, Military domain, Economic domain, Social/Cultural/Religious domain, Informational domain, and the Infrastructure domain. To create full SU of the operational environment, information and analysis are required across all of these domains. This requirement is the epitome of the old adage: “A problem well-defined, is a problem half-solved.”

I am sorry, but the USG Intel Community supporting operations in Afghanistan is not getting it done. There were DOD contractors who did the leg-work tromping around in Southern Afghanistan (without ISAF Force Protection) to gather information and conduct 1000+ interviews of the relevant Afghan population segments. This pilot project effort, on the purely “white side of IO” enabled the PMESII analysis and Target Audience Analysis required to obtain true SU–especially, in Helmand Province. This contractor team’s LANTERN methodology for TAA combined with [REDACTED] and trained indigenous interviewers’ assistance is the best I have seen in over 20 years in this business. The concept needs to be validated and codified into relevant Atmospherics and Human Terrain Team activities. In a complementary way, the separate info-gathering activities of Force Protection Atmospherics contractors (albeit more contentious) was extremely valuable in filling the SU gap for Force Protection within the Military Operators’ Area of Influence around various OPs, FOBs, and along the Durand Line.

Even in relatively small countries like Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is simply not enough human intelligence capacity to collect comprehensive information for Sr. Civilian and Military leaders in the USG to make sound policy, strategy, and programs for execution. Bureaucratic bumbling in these areas jeopardizes the “20-something year olds” fighting in the foxholes (e.g., OP Kamdesh, OP Wanat, etc.). Force Protection of our “blood” on the front lines is JOB #1. The Intel Community (IC), with its panoply of Oversight Laws, Executive Orders, IC and DOD directives, constantly loses focus on the Force Protection laws/directives (which are admittedly scarce compared to the Intelligence laws/directives). {“Force Protection is an inherent responsibility of all military commanders (at all levels.”)} “Soldiers as sensors” is a building-block step for the Military Operators to protect and control their “Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA).” A fundamental cornerstone for Force Protection. It is an unambiguous requirement to understand and engage our threats to our Operators’ immediate front. This is the Military Operator’s “Area of Influence.”

In Afghanistan, the Area of Influence is complicated, because the ISAF Military’s FEBA is at the Durand Line (Pakistani Border), but the Operator’s Area of Influence (and de facto Force Protection requirement) is located in Western Pakistan. The Situational Understanding required for Force Protection mandates must have the Collection of Human Intelligence and Atmospherics in Western Pakistan. Obviously, some gathering of information in Western Pakistan is ongoing to enable the “unconfirmed Predator Strikes” in Western Pakistan. Pounding those Western Pakistan sanctuaries is paramount to ISAF’s military (and political for that matter) success on the ground.

The alleged contentious atmospherics activities in AF-PAK (heavily reported in the media) have run afoul of this incomplete understanding of the mandate for Force Protection of our forces– which requires “SU of the Area of Influence.” The advent of Atmospherics and Human Terrain Teams to fill this real Force Protection void are real and begging for solutions. The IC is overwhelmed and not organized to fill the immediate void. The Intel Community can no longer say “we have it covered” for you Military Operators. OP Kamdesh, OP Wanat, FOB Chapman are all prime examples of Intel Early Warning shortcomings.

Sr. DOD leadership is COMPELLED to address this shortfall of: “Force Protection trumping outdated Intel Laws and Policies.” SU for preemptive Force Protection and military operations to counter the threat must be conceptualized and codified into new Laws and Policy to balance the over-regulated (and under-performing) Intelligence Community collection process. The “blood of our 20-something year olds” in the foxholes on the FEBA (and elsewhere in this asymmetric COIN environment) are at stake.”

This witch hunt “investigation” into Michael Furlong didn’t happen by accident. He has made some very powerful enemies at the CIA. That said, considering how successful he has been protecting the men and women of the U.S. Military, he should have made even more powerful friends at the Pentagon.

Secretary Gates is a smart man. He has to realize the value of a person like Michael Furlong, as well as the value of his Force Protection and Atmospherics program, especially as it has been characterized as one of the most “successful Force Protection programs in modern history.”

So, you may ask, if Furlong and his program have been saving American lives left, right, and center, why collapse it? Why would Secretary Gates allow this to happen? Why isn’t he leading the charge to protect Furlong? According to my sources, there is someone very close to the Secretary of Defense who is sympathetic to the CIA and who has been feeding Gates very bad information.

While we prepare our next article on the subject, all Americans should be asking the following questions – why is a high-level DoD official leaking the findings of a sham investigation to the New York Times and allowing an Associated Press reporter to sit in a room alone with a 15 page “Secret” DoD report? More importantly, why are we helping the enemy and putting our troops in even greater peril by discontinuing one of the best Force Protection programs this nation has ever known?

And finally, why would an honorable man like Robert Gates allow a hero like Michael Furlong – a man who believes there is nothing more important than protecting the lives of our men and women in uniform – to be sacrificed for simply doing his job?