Russia Looks to China as U.S. Leaves Void in Asia

After a clash in the disputed East China Sea last month between China and Japan, China initiated a boycott of Japanese goods and held up exports of material needed by Japanese electronics manufacturers.

Weeks later, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev planned to visit the South Kuril Islands–controlled by Russia but claimed by Japan–on his way back from China to Moscow.

The Japanese leadership, furious, felt squeezed by the two powers. Which is exactly the message Russia and China intended to send to the West.

“Moscow knows that behind Japan stands the U.S.,” wrote M. K. Bhadrakumar.

Medvedev’s recent visit to China was to inaugurate a new oil pipeline between the two nations and to continue discussions over China’s planned increase in Russian gas imports.

While suspicious of any projection of military power in its near-abroad, Russia views economic projection as mostly beneficial. This is because Russia wields political influence with most of the countries in its sphere of influence, so its leadership generally assumes it holds a veto over deals conducted between many–though certainly not all–Central Asian countries and outsiders. And Russia itself can be the beneficiary of roving sovereign investors because of its rich resources (including non-OPEC oil).

China, then, is a near-perfect regional ally for Russia.

But the Russia-China alliance is also capitalizing on age-old rule: Nature abhors a vacuum. As Steve LeVine pointed out, the American response to the violence in Kyrgyzstan this summer mirrored Russia’s, and it came only after Russia took the first step.

LeVine contrasts this with the Bush administration’s response in 2005 to violence in Uzbekistan, when the U.S. airlifted and relocated victims. “If this trend continues,” LeVine writes, “Washington’s willingness to defer to Russia in the land of Kipling may mark the beginning of something larger: a new era in which the Great Powers attempt to tread more gingerly in each other’s backyards. The implications of this shift are great, and potentially risky.”

This is evident with regard to India as well. By ignoring India early in his presidency, casting suspicion on the U.S.-India nuclear deal, and naming India as playing a role in American unemployment by attracting U.S. outsourcing, Obama managed to put on ice the strategic relationship the Bush administration so deftly established.

This did not escape the attention of Russia and China (who had brought India into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer state in 2005).

Two weeks ago, Russian officials finally announced they would transfer the K-152 Nerpa nuclear submarine to India on a $900 million, ten-year lease beginning in March 2011. On October 7, the Russian state arms exporter told reporters they were in talks with India to jointly build a stealth fighter and that Russia will likely supply India with more Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets. In March, Russia and India signed a deal to have Russia help build nuclear reactors in India.

Taken individually, none of these examples of Russian-Indian cooperation acutely threatens the West. But on the whole, a picture is emerging of a strengthening Russia-India-China association.

This is significant to our allies in the region for two reasons. First, Japan and South Korea rely on an understanding that the U.S. stands behind them, but Obama has given them reason to doubt our determination. Second, Obama’s decision to openly defer to Russia’s leadership in Central Asia sends the message that he will defer to China in its backyard as well–a simply frightening prospect to Japan and South Korea, who may seriously consider pursuing nuclear capability in response.

It should also be noted that Chinese financial leverage affects geopolitics–consider the sudden lack of American interest in Chinese human rights violations. Similarly, thanks to its investments in Central Asia, China holds the upper hand in its partnership with Russia.

According to Moscow-based financial strategist Chris Weafer, “China has now been able to put the gun to the head to the Russians to some extent and say, ‘You have got to do this now, on terms that suit us. Otherwise we are not going to do it all, because we have other options.’ China can get more energy supplies from Central Asia.”

Concessions to Russia as part of the “reset” have been designed to get diplomatic assistance to the U.S. on the Middle East and Afghanistan in return. But if that assistance is now at the whim of China’s leaders, Americans and our allies can be forgiven for wondering what kind of concessions to the Chinese are now on the table.