Slander: How it is Used and Abused Under Shariah

Part 6 of a serialization of Shariah – The Threat to America, the report of Team B II of the Center for Security Policy.

Given the importance the enemy’s doctrine attaches to information dominance – evident in the legitimacy shariah assigns to lying and taqiyya – it is hardly surprising that this threat doctrine also seeks through other means to keep people unaware of the true character and intentions of shariah’s adherents.

In fact, Islamic law provides, in tandem with the right to deceive Muslims and non-Muslims, an enforceable requirement to make disclosure of those rules a punishable offense. This is among the purposes of the shariah concept of slander, which differs significantly from its Western counterpart.

In short, telling the truth about what Islamic leaders want hidden is, under sharia, a form of slander that must be punished.

The authoritative 14^th century Reliance of the Traveler, cited throughout the Team B report, contains the following relevant passages that to this day guides sharia-compliant Muslims about slander:

• “Slander (ghiba) means to mention anything concerning a person that he would dislike.”
• “As for talebearing (namima), it consists of quoting someone’s words to another in a way that worsens relations between them.”
• “The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said:

“The talebearer will not enter paradise.”

“‘Do you know what slander is?’ They answered, ‘Allah and His Messenger know best.’ He said, ‘It is to mention of your brother that which he would dislike.’ Someone asked, ‘What if he is as I say?’ And he replied, ‘If he is as you say, you have slandered him, and if not, you have calumniated him.'”

“The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim. He does not betray him, lie to him, or hang back from coming to his aid.”

• “In fact, talebaring is not limited to that, but rather consists of revealing anything whose disclosure is resented, whether presented by the person who originally said it, the person to whom it is disclosed, or by a third person. . . . The reliability of the talebearing lies in divulging a secret, in revealing something confidential whose disclosure is resented. A person should not speak of anything he notices about people besides that which benefits a Muslim to relate or prevents disobedience.”

From such definitions, it is easy to see how a legally sanctioned code of silence could be imposed and enforced. Taken together with the rules on lying and taqiyya, it is easy to understand how self-identified “moderate” Muslims can insist that acts of terrorism undertaken by “extremists” had nothing to do with Islam – even in cases where the perpetrators and their supporters explicitly claim Islam as the motivation, often on television broadcasts receiving rapturous applause from other Muslims.

These attributes of shariah have two significant implications for US security policymakers. In accordance with the definition of “talebearing” in Reliance, the disclosure of any sensitive information to non-Muslims is forbidden, where “sensitive” means any information that puts Islam or a Muslim at a disadvantage. Hence, a shariah-adherent Muslim risks eternal damnation if he discloses to a non-believer information that would cause the non-believer to question either a Muslim or Islam.

In other words, law enforcement, military and intelligence services may be relying on individuals whose behavior is governed by shariah – thus subordinating national security collection requirements and practices to potentially restrictive and manipulative disclosure rules dictated by Islamic law.

This is submission. This practice also turns all professional notions of competent analysis and information security on their heads.”

In the following section of this series, Part 7, we will discuss how Team B approached the issue of blasphemy as defined under shariah – a corollary to the Islamic rule against disclosing anything dangerous to Islam.