'Good War' Counter-Insurgency Rx–Colonize or Go Home (Part 2)

Read part I of this post here.

Another highly successful counter-insurgency occurred in Hungary in 1956. Hungary was occupied by the Soviet Union after WWII. After a typical communist charade of free elections, the Hungarian government became a de facto colony of the Soviet Union. The USSR controlled the government and its economic and security policies. After six years of crushing Soviet communist domination, proud Hungarians, prodded by American covert action, began demonstrating against the communists. The demonstrations quickly spun out of control, and became a full-fledged insurgency, with fierce urban guerrilla warfare. The Soviets responded with an invasion in force. Their total domination of the entire country, administratively, militarily, and economically, crushed the insurgency in less than two months.

The American experience with counter-insurgency in Vietnam is an interesting negative example. The US placed severe restrictions on its military operations against the combined forces of indigenous and foreign communist guerrillas. In the post-colonial era, the US was wary of charges of neo-colonialism. America allowed the South Vietnamese to run the government fueled by American dollars. Much like today in Afghanistan, American advisers looked on in helpless frustration. Corruption and in-fighting severely weakened social, economic, and military infrastructure throughout the country. America’s counter-insurgency was doomed from the start. Without control of the political and economic infrastructure, military operations were unable to gain traction.

The Kennedys attempted to avoid the sure condemnation by the media that would come with an overt colonial-style imposition of government on their Vietnamese client-state. Instead, they tried to use covert action. They approved a coup against the ruling Diem family, which resulted in the murder of the Vietnamese President (above) and his family. That bungled attempt at colonial power mongering spoiled the Kennedys’ appetite for further meddling. A constant turnover of civilian and military rule in the Vietnamese government followed, with some governments lasting only weeks. With no foundation to support itself, the civilian population was left to its own devices. Although American military and civilian forces kept working to defeat the communist insurgency, the slow-motion collapse of the South Vietnamese government doomed the counter-insurgency.

These examples of counter-insurgency operations reveal a broad outline of the requirements for success. They also reveal the conditions that ensure failure of counter-insurgency operations.

Full-blown colonial control of a country’s political, economic, and legal infrastructure provides a solid foundation to wage a successful counter-insurgency. The campaigns against indigenous forces in Malaya, the Moroland, and Hungary demonstrate the requirements for crushing such indigenous enemies. The template of requirements includes: complete colonial-style control of the contested country and full control of the political, military, and economic infrastructure of the country.

On the other hand, America’s war in Vietnam is a template for failure in operations against indigenous insurgents. First, we did not maintain full control of the contested nation during the hostilities. The American administration attempted to use covert action to cloak its hand in controlling the client-state’s government. Finally, civilians placed severe restrictions on military operations against the insurgents and their masters in North Vietnam.

Comparing these templates with Petreaus’ dizzying task in Afghanistan reveals a near perfect match with the template for failure. We do not control the government infrastructure. President Karzai fired his pro-American Interior Minister, and intel chief. We do not control the economy or military. We have placed ourselves in a subordinate role, pretending that this is an Afghan problem, and we are just advisors. We hide behind a “coalition” of NATO and other allies, which make up a tiny fraction of forces, but complicate the operations exponentially. We have placed restrictions on our military actions (how about a medal for “courageous restraint?”). We undertake, covertly, actions which the President loudly decried during his campaign (targeted killings).

In Afghanistan, we stand at a crossroads–there are three possible paths ahead. Annexing Afghanistan as an American colony will lead to success and honor in the long run, with short term international condemnation. Maintaining the current status quo can only lead to inglorious defeat in both the short and long runs. Draw-down and withdrawal could also be an honorable conclusion, except for blame that will be heaped on us for the certain political and social failures that follow in the wake of our exit.

With Obama declaring an end to Iraq, maybe his much-vaunted genius will come up with a solution to Afghanistan. The choices are clear for anyone who examines the realities of COIN: Full-blown colonial power; half-hearted attempts at politically-correct advise-and-equip; or cut-and-run. Obama and his geniuses asked for the job. The new Republican Congress, with hearings and oversight, should keep us out of too much trouble. It should be an interesting two years.