This book is almost required reading, and has been since the late ’90s. In the book, there are a few things worth looking at.
Instead of recommending the president deploy five divisions, the level of force [General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff] and Army planners felt was necessary to achieve a free and independent South Vietnam, he made the “politically feasible” recommendation for one division, as long as the others were added later. Years afterward he regretted the he did not ‘push’ for the deployment of the four-division anti-infiltration force (p 247).
…
Congressional faith in the integrity of the military was based, in part, on the expectation that the JCS views and recommendations were independent of partisan political concerns and based solely on officers’ experience and evaluation of the military aspects of the situation. Johnson and his advisers predicated the Gulf of Tonkin reprisal, however, on domestic political conerns and their election-year campaign strategy, hiding the true basis of their decisions behind the impression that they were simply supporting the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (p 135).
Ever since, most of our General Officers – or at least our best ones – don’t want to be known as “that guy” in 20-30 years.
I think that the words of eighteenth century military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz are as relevant today as they were in his own time:
The first duty and the right of the art of war is to keep policy from demanding things that go against the nature of war, to prevent the possibility that out of ignorance of the way the instrument works, policy might misuse it.
The consequences of mistakes in war are most often unforeseen and disastrous.
In that same interview, he stated the larger lesson for our highest officers:
I have had the opportunity to speak with groups of senior officers and many have told me that Dereliction of Duty has helped them think about their responsibilities and difficult decisions they must make as senior military advisers. My research convinced me that character was the most important factor in determining how these men discharged their duties. I imagine that the book affects each person differently.
I believe that the principle lesson one might learn from the “five silent men” is not to compromise principle for expediency. Other relevant lessons include the debilitating effect of service parochialism. I would like to also make the point that Lyndon Johnson ultimately got the military advice he wanted. He and McNamara were arrogant in their belief that they did not require advice based on JCS military experience and education. What they wanted instead was silent acquiescence for decisions already made and the legitimacy lent their policies by the chiefs’ uniforms.
That is the background. As we have covered here, there is a growing disconnect between the very real world of sound military policy and the cognitive disconnect spawned by President Obama’s disastrous West Point speech – the JUL 2011 preemptive retreat announcement.
The DOD from SECDEF Gates on down is trying to open a window of opportunity for the CINC to “revise and extend” his remarks. With each passing month though, the window closes more and more as he continues to double down on a predetermined withdrawal date based on nothing but a calendar.
No one wants to be judged by history as “that guy.” That should explain a lot what General Conway, USMC said yesterday.
The top U.S. Marine general made a sharp departure from the White House’s talking points on Afghanistan, saying President Barack Obama’s promised July 2011 deadline to start withdrawing troops from the country had given “sustenance” to the Taliban.
“We know the president was talking to several audiences at the same time when he made his comments on July 2011,” Gen. James Conway told reporters on Tuesday. “In some ways, we think right now it’s probably giving our enemy sustenance… In fact, we’ve intercepted communications that say, ‘Hey, you know, we only have to hold out for so long.'”
This was not a mistake by Gen. Conway. He did not misspeak. If we can’t get towards a more sound policy, I would expect more of this from our uniformed leadership – as it should be. People should remember that the US military owes its duty to the Constitution – not to a man. It is illegal to make a false official statement. One day, we may all have to make an official statement to explain why we did what we did. No one wants to be standing in front of a Senate Panel in 2025 and saying, “I was not telling the truth as I saw it in 2010. I was just repeating talking points I was given. I was just following orders.”
Like I wrote you nine months ago, to the enemy’s ears we signaled retreat. Unless we change that signal, that is what we will get.
At least we can count on the Marines to keep speaking the truth as they see it on the ground.
Conway said the Marines would continue to go after the Taliban, regardless of the 2011 deadline. “I certainly believe that some American units somewhere in Afghanistan will turn over responsibilities to Afghanistan security forces in 2011, I do not think they will be Marines,” he said.
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