KC-X Tanker War: The Antonov Alternative

American aerial tankers are the backbone of western airpower. Without them, not only are large swathes of the USAF effectively grounded, so are many allied air forces flying in places like Afghanistan.

Everyone knows about the “KC-X” tanker war underway between Boeing and EADS. A series is coming to Big Peace that will talk about the $35 billion competition, and the case for each side. Just before the July 2010 bid deadline, however, a 3rd contender appeared. It might even be a real offer involving… Antonov?!?

Before we start in on Boeing and EADS, let’s take a closer look at that one…

At the beginning of July 2010, a company called US Aerospace announced an agreement with Antonov, to partner on a KC-X bid.

What was even more remarkable, was the content of those bids. Indeed, “remarkable” is a rather diplomatic term for an offer that involves its AN-124, a super-heavy cargo plane whose 150 tonne/ 165 ton cargo capacity is 23% larger than the USA’s gargantuan C-5B Galaxy. A second option would reportedly involve an “AN-112,” a new aircraft tailored to KC-X specifications. Their agreement with the Ukrainian firm, said the releases, would give US Aerospace lead contractor status and final American assembly rights under a KC-X contract. Antonov would be the technical lead, and manufacture components. A few days later, US Aerospace announced that their bid was in, at $150 million per plane.

That’s the surface story. If we accept it at face value, they’re offering 179 militarized planes at about the same base price as a commercial 767/ A330, with a level of secondary cargo capability that would far exceed the USAF’s ordered fleet of 223 C-17s. AN-124s can use Western engines and avionics, are already leased by the Pentagon to delivery heavy cargo to places like Afghanistan, and are widely used by allies via NATO’s SALIS contract. An order would also create an assembly line that could serve the commercial outsize heavy lift market, which is growing rapidly in North America and needs more airframes.

So far, it sounds intriguing. Unlike the March 2010 UAC/ IL-96 KC-X hoax, this report has much more backing behind its assertion of a bid. The question is whether it makes any more sense.

It doesn’t. In fact, it’s probably deliberately misleading. Understand why, and you’ll leave with a better understanding of defense buys.

Let’s put our skeptic hats on, and remember some realities. We’ll make it easy, and make 2 big assumptions. One is that production would become entirely self-sufficient in the USA if required, with no significant dependence on Russia or the Ukraine if push came to shove. We’ll also assume that a competition with 373 mandatory requirements, which required 8,000 page bid submissions, could be prepared by this team within a week of its announcement. In other words, that they’ve spent the advance months and $50 million dollars or so required for a serious bid (EADS spent $75,000 just in Round 2 printing costs). Color me dubious.

We begin with operating costs. Unless you crash your car within the first few years, most of its real cost isn’t paid when you buy it. People often make that mistake when thinking about their cars, and they make it when thinking about weapons, too. It becomes especially important when you consider that the youngest KC-135 tanker has been flying in the USAF for over 40 years. KC-X tankers are going to have a lifespan at least that long.

Now, what kind of lifetime operating costs would be associated with a plane whose empty weight is double an A330’s or a 767’s?

We begin to see the problem.

Now add questions like how many KC-124s could fit in the parking slots at Diego Garcia, or Guam, and how many other planes they’d displace. What would have to happen to the infrastructure at existing bases, in order to accommodate an aircraft with almost twice the length and wingspan as the KC-135R?

These sorts of issues are why RAND’s 2004 Analysis of Alternatives rejected a C-17 tanker as a viable option, and concluded that converted large passenger jets made by far the most sense. There’s a point at which the extra capability starts to cost too much, at multiple levels – a problem example worth remembering, because it surfaces in a number of American weapons like the V-22, LPD-17, etc.

Reports of a custom designed “AN-112” make even less sense. At least the IL-96 rumors involved an appropriate size and type of aircraft as a base. Antonov doesn’t even have a base airframe to work from. Its AN-148 is just a large regional jet, and its AN-70 propfan transport has speed limitations. Development and certification for a new aircraft can easily take a decade: the 777’s 7-year timeline was fast by industry standards.

The concept that Antonov would or could develop an entirely new aircraft, which would meet KC-X specifications, in any kind of time frame that could work for the US military, could only be believed by someone without any background understanding of the industry. Even a proposal to add jet engines to the AN-70 would face significant testing and certification hurdles, and still leave them with an aircraft whose aerodynamics were sub-par for the tanker mission.

The takeaway lessons? Several. It’s not the buying, it’s the owning. Capabilities can’t be considered without costs. Engineering and testing take time, and the laws of physics have their say, too. A press release does not equal real capability, and companies aren’t above dishonesty. Finally, there is no substitute for real understanding of the field among reporters covering it.

You may wonder: why did US Aerospace even bother? It’s a good question. Defense News may have the answer that explains the hype:

“…a May 24 SEC report filed by U.S. Aerospace signals it is in financial trouble. A number of factors “raise substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern,” the firm told federal regulators.”

So, they baited their hook with the releases. I wonder if they caught an investor or 2. I sure hope that, after reading this article, they didn’t hook you.