Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has become something of a proxy battlefield for drones from Turkey and Iran. Ukrainian defense forces have made spectacular use of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones, which have become one of the hottest military products in the world, while Iran is (not very) secretly believed to be supplying Russia with its Mohajer and Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 drone swiftly became the stuff of literal campfire songs in Ukraine, famed for its ability to wipe out Russian artillery and armored vehicles at considerable distances with minimal risk to the operators.
The TB-2, which has been selling like hotcakes since its similarly dramatic performance against Russian-allied Armenian forces in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, is highly capable, relatively easy to use, and very cost-effective.
The Turkish military used its own version of the TB-2 to great effect against Russian missile launchers in Syria beginning in 2014, which really should have tipped Moscow’s military planners that Bayraktar drones are very effective at destroying Russian hardware.
For reasons the Turkish military and drone maker Baykar Makina are probably not eager to discuss in public, Bayraktar series drones have proven highly adept at evading Russia’s older air defense systems. Designer Selcuk Bayraktar has suggested the heavy concentration of jamming equipment in Turkey, due to the Turkish government’s long-running battle with Kurdish separatists, made his TB-2 superior because it was born in one of the world’s worst electronic warfare environments, so it came out of the crib ready to evade sensors and resist jamming attacks.
One of the TB-2’s big advantages is its compact and highly portable launch platform, which allows its operators to remain highly mobile and evade counterattacks. Bayraktar drones can be launched off flatbed trucks, and as mentioned above, their control signals are difficult to trace or disrupt.
Despite its modest size, the drone has sufficient engine power and endurance to carry four light laser-guided missiles, which can be fitted with armor-piercing warheads. The TB-2 lacks the payload and range of top-shelf U.S. military drones, but at roughly $2 million apiece, it also costs only five or ten percent as much.
“The TB-2 and its accompanying munitions combine technical abilities with an affordability that means their commanders can tolerate some attrition while presenting real challenges to the enemy,” British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said in December 2020 to explain why the Bayraktar drone was the kind of military game-changer that comes along once or twice a century.
An important sign of the TB-2’s effectiveness was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s outrage at Turkey for selling the weapons to Ukraine. The political situation was made more delicate by the fact that Selcuk Bayraktar is married to the daughter of authoritarian Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This familial connection, plus the importance of Baykar products to Turkey’s technological and economic future, led Erdogan to politely but firmly reject all entreaties from Putin to shut down Ukraine’s supply of UAVs.
The Russian military has drones as well, but they apparently did not perform very well in Ukraine, and many of them were destroyed. Russia therefore turned to Iran for a fresh inventory of UAVs that might be capable of competing with the Bayraktar.
According to U.S., European, and Israeli intelligence reports, and contrary to denials from both Tehran and the Kremlin, Iran is supplying Russia with two types of drone: the Shahed-136 “suicide drone” and the Qods Mojaher-6, a long-range reusable drone that fills the same roles as the Bayraktar TB-2.
The Shahed-136, and a smaller companion model designated Shahed-131, are basically flying bombs or cut-rate cruise missiles. They are even cheaper than Turkey’s Bayraktars, with an estimated cost of perhaps $20,000 – but unlike the superstar Turkish UAV, the Shahed does not usually return from its missions. Each drone carries a warhead about one-tenth as powerful as Russia’s standard cruise missiles, but the drones are much cheaper and can “loiter” in a target area before committing to a kamikaze strike.
Like the Bayraktar TB-2, Shahed drones employ small, highly-mobile launchers, and fly low and slow enough to evade detection. Part of the Shahed’s low unit cost comes from the lack of advanced optical gear and the associated electronics needed to transmit high-quality images back to its operators. The standard Shahed-136 configuration uses simple radio signals for control, rather than satellite relays.
Russian units are reportedly using human spotters or other drones to acquire targets for the Shaheds, and launching the kamikaze drones in pairs, so they have a backup in case the first drone is intercepted, malfunctions, or misses its target.
Shahed drones have a distinctive delta-wing shape, with a propeller in back and bulbous warhead up front, as can be seen in the photos and videos shot by international journalists on Monday when suicide drones struck several targets in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, including an apartment building occupied by civilians.
The Russians have taken to repainting the drones in their own military colors and renaming them “Geranium-2 UAVs.”
Military analyst Alexander Kovalenko told the Odessa Journal on Monday that Russia made some upgrades to its Iranian suicide drones, sacrificing a little warhead space to replace the stock inertial guidance system with a more effective GLONASS satellite navigation system, Russia’s version of GPS. This upgrade sacrifices a portion of the drone’s explosive power to greatly increase its range and accuracy.
The Shahed-136 may be a smaller and simpler platform than the vaunted Bayraktars, but Ukrainian artillery commander Col. Rodion Kulagin told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on Monday they are a threat that should not be underestimated because Russia can afford to blanket the vast Ukrainian battlefield with swarms of the inexpensive weapons.
“In other areas, the Russians have overwhelming artillery firepower, and they manage with that. Here, they no longer have that artillery advantage, and so they have started to resort to these drones,” Kulagin said of reported Shahed-136 deployments in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv area.
Kulagin hoped the U.S. would assist Ukraine by providing more advanced air defense systems, or taking steps to shut down the flow of Iranian drones to Russia. As of Wednesday, the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed its troops have been able to shoot down 223 Shahed-136 suicide drones, using everything from jet fighters and surface-to-air missiles to man-portable weapons.
The Ukrainian Defense Ministry also reports Russia has deployed Iranian Mohajer-6 drones, a claim the Ukrainians backed up in early October with photos of a captured UAV.
The Mohajer-6 is much larger and more sophisticated than the Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. Like the Bayraktar TB-2, it can carry four guided missiles and return to base after launching them. The drone captured by Ukraine was carrying Ghaem-5 video-guided missiles, a weapon Iran designed especially to be launched by UAVs.
Unlike the Shahed-136, Mohajer drones have sophisticated cameras and electronic sensors. Ukrainian military sources claim Russia often uses Mohajer drones to survey a target area and coordinate Shahed suicide drone attacks.
The Bayraktar TB-2 easily wins a head-to-head matchup with the Mohajer-6, as the Turkish drone has much longer ranger, can stay in the air longer, carries heavier missiles, and can fly much higher.