Zumwalt: In Pyongyang Chess Match, the Next Move Is Trump’s

N. Korea says peace treaty no bargaining chip for denuclearisation
AFP

In chess, a limited number of opening moves exist. Both players know this, so neither is really blindsided by the other’s initial move. It is similar to the chess match in which President Donald Trump and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un are currently engaged — the latter now having made his opening move.

Despite niceties Trump has expressed about Kim since their summit and indications Kim’s request for a second summit will be granted, no one in the administration should have been blindsided by Pyongyang’s demand sanctions be lifted before denuclearization steps are undertaken. Pyongyang has a history of insisting upon “you-go-first” demands, which then go unreciprocated.

North Koreans have duped American presidents, Democrat and Republican alike, for decades. Since North Korea’s founding in 1945, its leaders understand U.S. presidents have four to eight years to pursue their objectives vis-à-vis Pyongyang. They recognize, too, that dictatorships for life give them the advantage of consistency in pursuing their own goals. Since 1945, there have only been three North Korean heads of state, compared to thirteen for the U.S. Thus, if facing a confrontational U.S. president, Pyongyang can simply wait him out. Historically, our presidents seemed blind to this, foolishly believing they could succeed where their predecessor failed.

President Bill Clinton grievously fell for the ploy. In 1994, concluding an “Agreed Framework” deal to end nuclear tensions, he announced that it represented “the first step on the road to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” While it did not, Clinton made a major good faith, but troubling, concession.

Clinton granted North Korea its request for safe passage of USS PUEBLO, which it had attacked and captured in 1968 in violation of international law, to relocate it from Wonsan Harbor to Pyongyang, a distance of over 1,000 nautical miles, without U.S. interference to re-take the ship. Today, the ship is docked in the Taedong River, displayed as a prize trophy by the military.

In 2002, in an effort to keep the Agreed Framework alive, President George W. Bush released $95 million to Pyongyang, also providing fuel oil, while waiving the requirement that North Korea first allow inspectors into the country. In 2008, he removed North Korea, at its insistence, from the list of foreign terrorist organizations. Unsurprisingly, Pyongyang again failed to reciprocate.

Pyongyang’s leadership undoubtedly treasured the presidency of Barack Obama who embarked upon his “strategic patience” approach. This was just a fancy name for “doing nothing” or, as one critic described it, “strategic passivity.”

Such a non-confrontational U.S. policy enabled Pyongyang to make substantial advances in its nuclear and missile development programs. Perhaps Obama’s motivation for this approach was his effort to negotiate a nuclear deal with Tehran, which was working closely with Pyongyang, fearing U.S. interference with North Korea’s programs might derail discussions with Iran.

This, undoubtedly, was why the 2015 agreement with Tehran was silent about it continuing to work with Pyongyang to achieve what was restricted under the deal. Rather than confront Iran on its nuclear cooperation with North Korea, Obama chose to take an “I know nothing” approach.

Undoubtedly encouraged by John Kerry’s recent advice to Iran to wait Trump out on its agreement, Kim seeks to do the same. But another development on the Korean Peninsula should make Trump realize he now needs to play hardball with Kim at the second summit.

South Korea President Moon Jae-in is a Korean version of Barack Obama. Just as Obama weakened U.S. military capabilities, Moon is doing the same for his, but more aggressively. With nothing more than having held three summits with Kim and nothing done north of the DMZ to demonstrate a reciprocal attitude, Moon is removing defenses along invasion routes into Seoul and proposing reductions in his military forces. Outlandishly, he is weakening Seoul’s negotiating position.

In addition, Moon has done things suggesting he prefers kowtowing to the North.

Similar to Obama who refused to wear an American flag lapel pin, neither Moon, during his most recent trip north, nor anyone on his team wore a South Korean flag lapel pin.

Additionally, Moon has taken steps to downplay his own country’s legitimate existence. Textbooks in the South have long asserted this right declaring itself as “the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula.” However, this declaration is to be removed from new textbooks. Meanwhile, Moon uses his control of broadcasters to reduce dissenting views and promote North Korea’s.

It is clear Moon is unwilling to confront Kim on the denuclearization issue — content, instead, to submit to the alpha dog by rolling over on his back. His defeatist attitude should be worrisome since, should the North attack the South, we are committed by treaty to its defense.

In his second summit, Trump needs to give Kim a strict timetable to implement denuclearization, without first lifting sanctions or making other contributions, unless he does so.

Kim recognizes that after so much time, effort, and money devoted to his nuclear program, he stands to lose tremendous face with his military by giving it up. Trump needs to get him over this hesitancy. Perhaps by threatening to sink our own ship, USS PUEBLO, in place, destroying its further use as a showpiece for his military, might convince Kim to get serious about denuclearization. Sinking our own ship, which we have a right to do since it remains ours, would demonstrate our seriousness about the matter and leave him guessing where we might strike next.

Interestingly, the real benefactor in all this could be China. It has long feared a North Korea collapse would generate a flood of refugees and leave reunification under Seoul’s tutelage. This would directly expose China’s border to democratic ideals. However, with Moon seemingly more interested in a unified peninsula dominated by Kim, China would enjoy a communist buffer free of a US force presence.

The next move on the chessboard needs to be a forceful one by Trump, lest Pyongyang be left once again to implement a successful delay strategy.

Lt. Colonel James G. Zumwalt, USMC (Ret.), is a retired Marine infantry officer who served in the Vietnam war, the U.S. invasion of Panama and the first Gulf war. He is the author of “Bare Feet, Iron Will–Stories from the Other Side of Vietnam’s Battlefields,” “Living the Juche Lie: North Korea’s Kim Dynasty” and “Doomsday: Iran–The Clock is Ticking.” He frequently writes on foreign policy and defense issues.

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